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Terminology 
 
This terminology draws particularly on Asma Barlas, „“Believing Women” in Islam‟ 
2002, University of Texas Press.  
 
QUR’AN – the word of God - the source of Truth for all Muslims and a means of 
realising it in action. Revealed by the Prophet Muhammed over a 23-year period 
in the 7th century in Arabia, first in Mecca and then in Medina.  
  
The Qur‟an is the text of the revelation it its original form, hence it is inviolate and 
incontrovertible.  However, it can be read differently depending on the context, 
conditioning and culture of its readers.  It can also be read differently because 
some Arabic words have several different meanings (polysemic) and because 
words in 7th century Arabia did not necessarily have the same meaning as they 
have today (Barlas 2002:35). When the Qur‟an is read in translation it can add to 
the complexity – which is why translations of the Qur‟an do not have the same 
authenticity as the original Arabic.  
 
SUNNAH – the Prophet‟s practice, including his sayings, actions and his tacit 
approval of behaviour he knew about as noted in the Ahadith (see below). 
Muslims view the Prophet‟s Sunnah as generalisable but it is difficult to 
generalise them in practice insofar as they were unique to the Prophet.  The idea 
of imitating the Prophet through a set of codified examples has proved 
problematic in several respects: 
 
- Most of the content of the Sunnah does not accurately reflect the 
Prophet‟s praxis. This was added by the early jurists of Islam who made 
deductions from the existing Sunnah, and also included practices from the 
Byzantine, Arab, Jewish and Persian cultures that they lived in. In this 
way, many pre-Islamic cultural practices were given elevated religious 
status. 
- The drafting of the Shari‟ah relied upon the Sunnah to a great extent – in 
fact more so than on the Qur‟an. As a result of the point above, Arab 
practices such as female circumcision and stoning to death for adultery 
became entrenched in the Islamic tradition. 
 
HADITH – the authenticated sayings of the Prophet, a narrative on his life and 
practices. These records began to be compiled a century after his death and were 
completed 300 or so years later.  Hadith (plural Ahadith) are categorised into 
three – those that are (i) reliable due to the scrupulousness of their transmitters 
and the historical authenticity of their context (ii) less reliable due to the 
„forgetfulness‟ of some narrators and (iii) weak.   
 
The hadith have several functions: they help with the interpretation of the Qur‟an; 
they give some Qur‟anic teachings specificity (e.g. they specify the number and 
content of daily prayers) and they also allow for coverage of issues for which the 
Qur‟an offers no precedents. For example, the Qur‟an does not specify the nature 
of institutions for governance but this was an important issue for jurists and 
political leaders after the Prophet‟s death.  They therefore used their 
understanding of the Prophet‟s life and actions to decide how best to govern - 
these understandings then became incorporated into the hadith and thus became 
part of authenticated tradition.  (Barlas 2002:43-5) 
 
 5 
Many aspects on the hadith can be read as anti-women.  This is not surprising as 
they reflect the prevailing notions at the time they were codified (7th – 11th 
centuries) - ideas and customs associated with patriarchal Mediterranean 
societies that saw women as defiling, unclean and intellectually inferior.  Although 
there are only six „anti-women‟ hadith (out of a total of about 70,000) that are 
seen as Sahih (reliable) “…it is these six that men trot out when they want to 
argue against sexual equality, whilst perversely ignoring the dozens of positive 
hadith.   Interpretation and selection have therefore together provided a basis for 
patriarchy to claim it has religious authority.” (Barlas 2002:46) 
 
SHARI’AH refers to classical Muslim law. However, the term itself means „definition 
of practice‟.  The Shari‟ah provides guidance on how to conduct aspects of 
everyday life based on the Islamic model provided by the Qur‟an and the Sunnah. 
Its content is deduced by interpreting the Qur‟an through the Sunnah. “In effect, 
the principles of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh) are derived by way of the Sunnah, 
hence by limiting the Qur‟an‟s canonical authority” (Barlas 2002: 70).  Other ways 
of developing the Shari‟ah are consensus (ijma’), critical reasoning (ijtihad), and 
analogical reasoning (qiyas). 
 
There remains a tension between the weight given to the Qur‟an and Sunnah as 
sources of the Shari‟ah. The Shari‟ah also cannot be considered “a single logical 
whole” as it encompasses the diverse opinion of the four Sunni legal schools – 
Shafi, Maliki, Hanafi, and Hanbali, named after the four classical Islamic jurists 
who founded them. It is important to note that these jurists “agreed to differ…and 
more importantly, to accept each other‟s orthodoxy” (Barlas 2002: 71) 
 
IJTIHAD refers to the process of critical reasoning when applied to religious texts.  
It is a time honoured traditional method for understanding the Qur‟an and hadith, 
that reflects the fact that the Qur‟an is „an eternally evolving knowledge‟.  For 
Barlas and other Muslim feminists, as for male religious leaders, ijtihad allows „a 
process of recontextualising the Qur‟an through new modes of reading, none of 
which can exhaust its meanings‟. (Barlas ibid: 60) It is through ijtihad that male 
religious leaders have given the Qur‟an its patriarchal and anti-women 
interpretations; it is also ijtihad that allows Muslim feminists to revisit the texts, 
define previous interpretations in terms of their historical and cultural contexts and 
find meanings that accord with today‟s circumstances. The gates of ijtihad, as a 
source of Islamic law, are considered to have been closed early in Muslim history, 
although it is not clear exactly when this happened and who was responsible. 
Many Muslim scholars and activists are now actively calling for a revival of the 
practice. 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
Why this paper? 
 
1.1 This paper is written principally for DFID Social Development Advisers and 
others interested in gender issues in Muslim majority countries (MMCs).  It takes 
as its starting point the importance of understanding the movement towards 
greater religious observance amongst Muslim women in MMCs. This observance 
takes diverse forms but „veiling‟ (increased and changing forms of head and body 
covering) is the one most remarked upon by outsiders. Other visible expressions 
of piety include the increasing number of women praying regularly, their 
attendance at prayer meetings and/or study circles held in women‟s houses or the 
local mosque, and their support for religious political parties. 
 
1.2 For development practitioners the increasing religiosity of women in 
Muslim societies in the 21st century raises questions.  In UK university 
anthropological and sociological courses in the 1970s and 1980s veiling was 
seen as a symbol of patriarchal oppression with male dominance legitimised 
through both cultural tradition and religious prescription.  The veil indicated male 
control over a woman but also her inferiority; her sexuality was seen as the 
property of men, which had to be controlled to protect family honour. Islam as a 
religion tended to be presented in rigid and essentialist terms, as prescribing a 
given set of edicts on women‟s behaviour, edicts that were not seen – or were not 
presented – as open for debate or interpretation.  
 
1.3 This explanatory framework assumed that women who veiled were either 
forced into doing so or acquiesced as the result of brainwashing, false 
consciousness, lack of education or fear. Today, a very large number of women 
veil - and with some ferocity (many find curiosity about veiling bizarre at best, and 
at worst neo-orientalist and personally intrusive).  The point is that it is no longer 
possible to „explain‟ either women‟s various dress codes, nor their wider interest 
in understanding Islam, in terms of patriarchal insistence because a large number 
of educated women are choosing to veil, immerse themselves in religious study 
and find other ways to be „a true Muslim‟.  Other interpretative frameworks are 
needed to explain the upsurge in women‟s religiosity amongst all classes and 
across a very diverse region (West and North Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, 
including Indonesia – as well as Europe).  
 
1.4 Our starting point is that it is important for development policy makers and 
practitioners to take an interest in this upsurge in religiosity because it raises 
questions that touch on, even if they are not all central to, three areas of their 
work:  
 
• Women‟s rights and gender equality 
• Women as political actors (including in Islamist parties) 
• Women‟s involvement in civil society (including religious movements) 
 
1.5 Our intention is to introduce some of the literature on women‟s 
involvement in social and political religious movements as a way of understanding 
social change processes in MMCs.  This paper is not making an argument for 
more funding, nor does it recommend alternative approaches to aid in any of the 
above areas. It therefore has no overt policy objective other than to argue for a 
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greater understanding of the internal dynamics of what is happening within MMCs 
– an understanding that is not distorted by current political obsessions. 
 
The War on Terror lens: distorting, alienating, self-perpetuating  
 
1.6 Although there have existed „Islamic‟ approaches to gender issues since 
at least the 1970s these have remained largely invisible to western donor 
agencies.  However, the recent resurgence of Islamic identity by women and men 
in many countries – itself closely linked to the end of the Cold War, the 
emergence of the US as the sole superpower and the US declared „War on 
Terror‟ (read as „War on Islam‟ in much of the Islamic world) – is leading western 
development agencies to take stock and reconsider their approaches in MMCs. 
Donors are acknowledging that they have had few dealings with overtly Islamic 
groups over the last 20-30 years and have never engaged much with political 
parties, least of all Islamist parties. Should they be interacting more closely with 
these groups, including on gender issues?  
 
1.7 Two factors have accounted for donor hesitancy. The first is that relations 
between western and Muslim majority countries, traditionally a colonial one, are 
now being rearticulated through a War on Terror lens.  Over the last decade, and 
particularly since 9/11, donors have been drawn into having an interest in the 
Islamic world – including middle income Arab countries that are not primary 
partners – through a very specific window – that of security. Western donor 
ministries are being encouraged by their foreign and defence counterparts to 
„help‟ with security concerns by using their development budgets in ways that 
help ameliorate the grievances seen to underlie violence, including terrorist 
attacks. This inevitably leads critics in some Muslim majority countries to view 
development aid with even more suspicion than formerly: is this really a pro-poor 
project, or is it an invidious form of self-protection?  And why the belief that 
development aid can make a difference when a change in US and EU foreign 
policy and narratives - literally how Islam is spoken about and portrayed by 
western leaders and the media - is so clearly what is needed, and would have so 
much more effect? 
 
1.8 As if the terrorist issue has not muddied the waters enough there is 
another problem, one that springs from within the donor community itself. In line 
with western perceptions more generally, many donors continue to have a mental 
sticking point: they feel there will be no shared gender perspective with women 
identifying themselves in terms of their Islamic identity.  This is because they 
continue to see manifestations of religiosity, and particularly the veil, as 
oppressive of women and of being rooted in Islam as a religion.  There has 
therefore been a reluctance, perhaps even a fear, to try and understand overtly 
religious women‟s position on gender rights, lest it be impossible to find a 
common platform, or worse, that the two perspectives are incompatible. 
 
1.9 Neither of these two barriers – the War on Terror narrative and the 
uncertainty about a common position – should stop those interested in gender 
issues from better understanding the different ways in which women are pursuing 
their rights in MMCs. This paper, and the accompanying annotated bibliography, 
aims to analyse different positions taken and identify sources for further reading. 
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Sources 
 
1.10 The literature for this paper is mainly drawn from Muslim women scholars 
and activists who write from their own experience and knowledge of Islam. The 
accompanying annotated bibliography draws on a more comprehensive (though 
still highly selective) range of the work by respected scholars and activists who 
write on women and Islam.  As our sources indicate the term „Muslim majority 
country‟ or MMC includes countries in South Asia (e.g. Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
Indonesia), the Middle East and North Africa, including the horn, as well as 
Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey. We include northern Nigeria in this designation. 
 
Organisation of paper and annotated bibliography 
 
1.11 The paper is organised according to the three issues mentioned above.  
The sections are written separately even though there are overlaps in terms of 
concepts used, and in terms of practice (the issues at stake do influence each 
other on the ground).  The annotated bibliography is divided up in the same way 
in order to enable readers to focus on the area they are particularly interested in – 
given that time may preclude looking at all of them. 
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2.0 Women’s positioning on gender rights and equality  
 
2.1 It has hitherto been assumed, at least by western development 
practitioners, that women‟s rights are best attained through secularist liberal 
interpretations of equality, of the sort reflected in CEDAW type conventions.  Yet 
what does increasing use of the veil and greater religious observances across the 
Islamic world signify in this context? Does it reflect a rejection of these standards?  
And if understanding this move to greater religiosity requires a different paradigm 
of rights then how does this „Islamic‟ paradigm sit with the „western‟ one?  
 
2.2 A useful first step in conceptualising the different paradigms around 
women‟s rights in Muslim majority countries (MMCs) is to look at how women 
writers and activists from the region categorise their own and others‟ 
perspectives. Azza Karam makes a particularly useful three-fold categorisation.1   
She distinguishes (i) secularists (ii) Muslim feminists and (iii) Islamists.  These 
three perspectives exemplify the diversity of approaches to gender equality in 
MMCs.  
 
Secularist perspectives  
 
2.3 Those holding a secularist position in MMCs argue, in much the same vein 
as their western counterparts, that laws and practices relating to women should 
be based on a human rights framework and should not relate to religion (Karam 
1992:13) For them religion is a private matter and should not be the basis of laws, 
policies or institutions. The UN Convention on Eliminating All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) is a major and comprehensive 
reference point – it is the only international instrument that requires signatory 
governments to put in place laws that provide protection against discrimination 
against women in all fields - civil, political, economic, social, and cultural.  Whilst 
many MMCs have signed the convention2 there remains a huge gap between 
convention principles and what women experience in their everyday lives.  For 
secularists the problem is with religion itself – CEDAW and gender equality will 
never be attained whilst religion – in this case Islam - influences laws and 
practice.  The solution is therefore to take religious influence „out‟ of law and 
policy.  
2.4 In some MMC countries there is a long and deeply rooted secular tradition 
- in Bangladesh and Turkey for example.3  The rise of a more pronounced Islamic 
                                                        
1
 We adopt Karam‟s categorisation (1992:9-14). but change her terminology slightly.  Like some 
other writers Karam uses the terms „feminist/m‟ to describe all these forms of women‟s activism.  
We use it more sparingly. The debate on whether there is such a thing as „Islamic feminism‟ is a 
long one.  (See works by Margot Badran, Asma Barlas, Omaima Abou-Bakr, Nayereh Tohidi, Val 
Moghadam, Amina Wadud). Some writers do not use it on the basis that they see it as having a 
western, and therefore inappropriate and negative, connotation.   
2
 MMCs that have signed and ratified CEDAW include Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, 
Indonesia, Lebanon, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, UAE, Yemen. Also 
Nigeria.  
3
 Secularism has been part of Turkey‟s constitution since the proclamation of the Republic in 1923; 
the current AKP government is committed to secularism as the basis for state policy.  At the same 
time it has Islamic leanings and supports the rights of covered women to enter public places 
(particularly universities). In Bangladesh secularism was part of the constitution only between 1971 
and 1977; although subsequent secularist governments have never reinstated it as a constitutional 
pillar, support for a polity based on secularism has remained high, particularly amongst the 
intellectual NGO elite familiar to donors.  
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identity by men and women has been greeted with alarm by secularists; this has 
resulted in a noticeable - and at times antagonistic - secular-religious divide. For 
secularists in both countries a woman who veils cannot, by definition, be a 
women‟s rights activist.  Veiling („covering‟ in Turkey) indicates to secularists that 
women are either doing this involuntarily, or if it is a choice, then they are 
acquiescent in their continuing oppression.  Those who veil are seen to threaten 
the hard-won progress made by secularists on gender equality to date.  
 
2.5 There are, of course, exceptions to, and nuances within, this dichotomy. 
The main point is that women activists within MMCs do include secularists in the 
western sense. Indeed, with only a few exceptions donor funding has been to this 
group.  
 
Muslim feminist perspectives 
 
2.6 In contrast to the secularist position, Muslim feminists believe no 
meaningful change can occur in Muslim societies unless it derives its legitimacy 
from the Qur‟an‟s teachings. (Barlas 2002:3). Muslim feminists see equality and 
social justice as at the heart of Islam; the Qur‟an allows for gender equality in all 
spheres of life.  The problem is not with this divine text – it is the Word of God – 
but with how it and related texts, the hadith4 in particular, have been interpreted 
from the earliest times by trained religious leaders and jurists. Islamic texts, like 
other sacred texts, are polysemic (open to variant meanings).  This has allowed 
different „interpreters‟, from the 7th century onwards, to give meaning to words, 
phrases and verses according to their ideological stand and beliefs. Riffat Hassan 
puts the argument thus: „The dominant, patriarchal interpretations of Islam have 
fostered the myth of women‟s inferiority in several ways.  They have used sayings 
attributed to the Prophet Muhammed (including disputed sayings) to undermine 
the intent and teachings of the Qur‟an. They have taken Qur‟anic verses out of 
context and read them literally, ignoring the fact that the Qur‟an often uses 
symbolic language to portray deep truths.  And they have failed to account for the 
overriding ethical values of the Qur‟an, which stresses that human beings – 
women as well as men – have been designated God‟s khalifah (viceregent) on 
earth to establish a social order characterized by justice and compassion‟. 
(Hassan, p.1) 
 
2.7 In short, Muslim feminists explain the sexual inequality and oppression 
that women in MMCs experience largely in terms of the misogynist readings of 
the Qur‟an and other sacred texts by (male) religious leaders who first reflected, 
and through their interpretations further institutionalised, the patriarchal culture of 
their day.5  As Barlas notes: „The Qur‟an was revealed in/to an existing patriarchy 
and has been interpreted by adherents of patriarchies ever since.‟ (ibid 2002: xi) 
 
                                                        
4
 The hadith are the authenticated narrative of the Prophet‟s life compiled after his death and used 
to help interpret right behaviour.  According to Barlas they are particularly liable to 
individual/patriarchal/cultural interpretation because they were compiled over such a long period 
and had many authors. She remarks in an interview: „For a believer, the Qur‟an is a divine discourse 
and the hadith are not. Hadith are the result of human compilation and none of the people who 
compiled them ever claimed they were infallible….Whatever the Qur‟an opens up, the hadith can 
shut down‟ (Barlas 2005:5). See annex 1 for more details. 
5
 This is not to suggest that the anti-women bias in the interpretation of religious texts is the only 
source of women‟s position.   As Barlas notes this has been caused by multiple factors. „The history 
of Western civilization should tell us there is nothing innately Islamic about misogyny, inequality or 
patriarchy‟. (Barlas ibid: 2). 
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2.8 Muslim feminists believe that since gender equality is intrinsic to Islam 
interpretations that suggest otherwise must be revisited and reinterpreted. The 
scholars who undertake this task have a difficult job: they must separate out the 
word of the Qur‟an, itself inviolate and immutable, from the patriarchal and 
culturally specific interpretations given to the Qur‟an and particularly to the hadith. 
They must use arguments grounded in a deep understanding of Islamic theology, 
and interpretative history from the 7th century onwards.  Their books, articles and 
speeches therefore focus on refuting interpretations of specific verses and words 
that imply women are inferior by citing alternative sources that allow for a different 
reading of the text. 
 
2.9 These re-interpretive projects by Muslim feminist scholars inevitably meet 
with resistance from the traditional religious establishment, the majority of whom 
deny that Islam allows for individual interpretation, least of all by women.  (Karam 
ibid: 13) The very possibility of re-interpretation by women threatens their power 
base as the „only true‟ interpreters of Islam. Those who undertake this task are 
exceptional in their courage and in their ability.6  
 
2.10 It is important to emphasise that Muslim feminists do not take this religious 
interpretative route only for pragmatic reasons but because, as believing women, 
it is also the one most meaningful to them personally.  However, this is not to 
suggest that they use only this framework; when talking to non-Muslims they may 
couch their ideas within a human rights/CEDAW type perspective.  In this sense 
then they are in the middle of the three positions we are outlining: able to 
communicate with secularists because they are sympathetic to their goals, and 
potentially able to communicate with Islamists because of their knowledge of 
Islam.  
 
2.11 However, this does not mean that Muslim feminist arguments currently 
reach the majority population in MMCs.  This is despite their willingness to appear 
on TV and take part in debates on Islamic issues in addition to their academic 
writing and teaching.7 For the most part ordinary working women with little 
education and no internet access continue to be exposed to the traditional, i.e. 
patriarchal, interpretative tradition of the religious establishment in their countries.  
 
Islamist perspectives 
 
2.12 The term Islamist, used alone, generally connotes political party affiliation 
and some activist Islamist women will indeed belong to the women‟s arms of 
political parties whose aim is to replace secular law with religious law (Shari‟ah).  
However, we use the term more loosely here to include women activists who may 
share the broad aims of Islamist parties even if they are not members. 
 
2.13 A major difference between the Muslim feminist and Islamist perspective 
is that Islamists do not see it as the right of women to revisit the Islamic texts and 
reinterpret them on the basis of theological study and contextual understanding. 
                                                        
6
 Asma Barlas‟ book “Believing Women” in Islam: Unreading Patriarchal Interpretations of the 
Qur‟an is recommended for its depth of scholarship but also its readability.   
7
 Asma Barlas, Omaima Abou-Bakr and Amina Wadud are three of many scholars who regularly 
appear in TV interviews and public debates arguing for a gender perspective to the study of 
religious texts.  For example, see Abou-Bakr‟s argument in „A Muslim Woman‟s Reflection on 
Gender‟. http://www.islam21.net/pages/keyissues/key2-8.htm 
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They share an interest in clarifying the position of women through ijtihad8 and 
spend much time studying, analysing and referring to Islamic texts to support their 
arguments. But there is a difference between referring to traditional, authoritative 
interpretations of religious texts and finding the one most suited to the modern 
day context and attempting to re-interpret them, thereby challenging the 
traditional „right‟ of male Muslim leaders to do this. (Karam ibid: 12) Inevitably, by 
holding to the interpretations already set by established religious figures Islamist 
women come up with a much more conservative interpretation of women‟s rights 
than Muslim feminists.  
 
2.14 This conservatism can be seen in Islamist approaches to gender equality. 
Some Islamists argue that the Qur‟an does not allow for gender equality and they, 
as women, do not strive for it (Karam ibid: 10). They see it as a western concept 
that has bought nothing good for western women, condemned as they are to 
struggle for equality with men, and to fail. They argue that it is not necessary or 
even desirable to „equal‟ men in their various endeavours as they have different 
but complementary roles in life.  This stand on equality makes it difficult to bring 
Islamist, Muslim feminist and secularist women onto a common platform, 
including in international women‟s rights forums.9  
 
2.15 In some MMCs two factors particularly distinguish Islamist women.  The 
first is that most wear some form of veil. For Islamist women the veil is „an 
indisputable religious obligation‟ whereas for Muslim feminists it is a matter of 
personal choice and conviction (Karam ibid: 12). A second differentiating factor is 
that of class. The majority of ordinary women who support an Islamist position 
tend, in many MMCs, to be from lower middle class backgrounds, and although 
educated themselves, to have parents with primary or minimal education.  They 
may be first generation migrants to a town or city.10  They, like their male 
counterparts, are therefore an upwardly mobile group who nonetheless face 
significant frustrations in dealing with town or city life. Their overall conservatism 
and indeed their propensity to veil must be seen in this light.  
 
A note on this categorisation 
 
2.16 Like all categorisations this one is imperfect on several counts; for one 
thing, many women may see themselves as being somewhere in between two 
perspectives, others will not self-identify in terms of the labels.  There are also 
significant differences of perspective within each of these categories. But the 
model, though imperfect, is helpful. It makes the obvious point that women in 
MMCs argue for rights within quite different conceptual frameworks and in many 
MMCs it is the secularist/human rights perspective that carries least weight. Using 
it to argue for women‟s rights is therefore not an option if the intention is to win 
over a majority audience within the country or region. 
                                                        
8
 Ijtihad: independent enquiry into the textual sources, particularly the Qur‟an and hadith, in order to 
identify an interpretation of the religious texts that are appropriate to the conditions of life at the 
time. (Karam ibid:252) 
9
The term eventually promoted by MMCs in the run up to the Beijing Women‟s Conference in 1995 
was equity rather than equality.  This was on the basis that the word equity was seen to affirm equal 
women‟s access to rights – but these could be different rights to those of men. (Karam ibid: 6) This 
compromise on the word „equality‟ has occurred in other contexts, discussed later. 
10
 These findings on the backgrounds of women who follow the Islamist „trend‟ are based on a study 
from Egypt reported by Leila Ahmed (1992:222).  They also hold for the same group of women in 
Turkey.  
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What about collaboration? 
 
2.17 Do women holding different perspectives collaborate?  This happens but 
there are often difficulties.  This is partly because the issues that bring women 
together - laws that discriminate against them – tend to be in the area of Family 
Law, the area most prone to patriarchal interpretation.  Thus getting a joint 
position on an issue like inheritance rights is difficult.  Whilst secularists and 
Muslim feminists might agree – albeit using different frameworks – that women 
and men should have equal inheritance rights Islamist women are more likely to 
accept the traditional Shari‟ah injunction that women receive approximately half 
what men receive, on the basis that it is men, and not women, who are 
responsible for providing for the family.11 
 
2.18 Even on an issue like female genital mutilation (FGM), which most activist 
women oppose, it has proved difficult to get a united front at critical moments. 
This lack of unity partly accounts for late action on FGM in Egypt. When women 
failed to unite against FGM in 1994 the government, faced with Muslim men and 
religious leaders who did not oppose the practice, passed a milder law, restricting 
the practice to doctors, thereby continuing its legality (Karam ibid: 173).  It was 
banned in 1997 after the death of a young girl but ad hoc enforcement means it 
remains common.12  
 
2.19 One of the most hotly debated topics amongst activist women in many 
MMCs is the right of women to interpret Islamic texts. Saska Weiringa traces the 
history of how women‟s right to interpret Islamic texts took hold in Indonesia.  
Although spearheaded by Muslim feminists in the early 1990s it was gradually 
taken up by more conservative but mass-based Islamist groups and today there is 
a lively debate on this issue.  Nonetheless, Weiringa notes there are still „far 
reaching differences between these individual scholars (i.e. Muslim feminists) and 
the various groups (i.e. Islamists)‟ (Wieringa 2005:7).   
 
2.20 Another area where collaboration is problematic is when a country or 
region needs to present its position on gender equality in international forums 
(see discussion on the lead up the 1995 Beijing conference footnoted earlier).  
Joy Ezeilo gives an example of her personal involvement in building a common 
platform in Nigeria: „I was actively involved in the effort to pressure the UN 
Commission on Human Rights in Geneva to pass a resolution concerning equal 
inheritance rights for men and women.  Initially our advocacy materials bore the 
inscription „women‟s equal rights to equal inheritance‟… That changed, however, 
when our Muslim sisters in the struggle from Asia and Africa informed us that 
equal rights to equal inheritance would not fly under Islamic law and culture. They 
also noted that we would lose their support if we continued to use equality 
language… we reluctantly but sensibly dropped a demand for equal inheritance 
and argued instead for a general right to inheritance‟ (Ezeilo 2006:41). She notes 
that this compromise meant, in effect, aiming for women to get half a loaf before 
                                                        
11
 Amina Wadud argues that the „two to one‟ formula is just one of many proportional divisions 
between men and women referenced in the Qur‟an. She says it is necessary to look at the full 
extent of Qur‟anic provision around inheritance, including at verses that pay attention to the 
circumstances of the deceased and of those who inherit. Overall she argues, all combinations of 
redistribution need to be taken into account „for the equitable distribution of inheritance‟ (Wadud, 
1999:87).  
12
 Research by UNICEF in 2005 found that 96% of Egyptian women aged 15-49 who had ever been 
married reported they had been circumcised. The Guardian, 30/6/2007 
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insisting on a full share. She concludes that this „may be the only option for 
feminists working in societies that live under Islamic law or Shari‟ah‟.  Muslim 
feminists might disagree with this - their approach would surely be to challenge 
the interpretation of Islamic texts that purported to differentiate between women 
and men in the first place.  But, as we have noted, the Muslim feminist voice is 
still a minority one and Ezeilo‟s observations hold for many MMCs. 
 
Positions on veiling13 
 
2.21 As noted previously, secularist women in MMCs do not veil (unless it is 
essential for their protection or a legal requirement) and see any form of veiling 
worn for religious reasons as intrinsically oppressive.  In this they follow the 
position on the veil by western secularists and former colonial powers.  In contrast 
Islamist women see the veil as an essential aspect of their identity – it is both a 
sign of their religious piety and an expression of their membership of a global 
community.  For a politicised minority it is also a political statement – a 
repudiation of everything colonial, hegemonic and Western (Ahmed 1992: 235).  
  
2.22 The Muslim feminist approach is that veiling is a matter of personal 
choice.  But this does not fully convey the discussions that Muslim feminists have 
about the veil.  Certainly within some countries the trend towards veiling is 
completely understandable to Muslim feminists, given the group of women that it 
involves – urban women from lower middle class backgrounds that are the first 
generation in their families to have a full education. It is first and foremost an 
expression of religious belief but it also has practical benefits. As Leila Ahmed 
notes, it gives women the freedom to operate in comfort and with the approval of 
family members in sexually mixed environments (universities, work places, public 
transport).  In this sense it is enormously liberating. According to the type of 
covering used, its fabric, colour and how it is worn, it can also be a fashion 
statement, like any other form of dress. Ahmed argues that Islamic dress is also 
„democratising‟ in the sense that formerly dress codes were always defined by the 
elite whereas the emerging predominance of Islamic dress is evident of „a 
vocabulary of dress and social being, defined from below, by the emergent middle 
classes‟. Seen from this perspective Islamic dress is not a return to traditional 
dress (many veiling styles are new and not traditional at all) but the adoption of a 
modern form of dress, „with modifications to make it acceptable to the wearer‟s 
notions of propriety‟ (Ahmed ibid: 224-5). 
 
2.23 What Ahmed and others worry about is not veiling per se but the symbolic 
message it may send to hard line Islamist parties.  She says that widespread 
veiling may lend „…support and strength to Islamist political forces which, if 
successful in realising their objectives would institute authoritarian theocratic 
states that would undoubtedly have a devastatingly negative impact on women‟  
(Ahmed ibid: 231). Her concern is compounded by research findings that show 
many young women (veiled and unveiled) are actually vague about the content of 
Islamic law, and think „…that Islam is fundamentally just and that justice must 
inhere somewhere in its laws‟ so they don‟t consider what has actually happened 
when Islamist political leaders have come to power and forcibly implemented a 
version of Shari‟ah that has treated women brutally (Zia-ul-Haq‟s Islamisation 
programme in Pakistan; post-revolutionary Iran.)  In short, veiling per se is not the 
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 We use the term veiling as shorthand – what is being discussed here is the adoption of Islamic 
dress. The form this takes varies: it may refer to a form of head covering only (a headscarf), head 
and shoulder covering (hejab), a head and face covering (niqab), plus various forms of long coat.  
Alternatively, a single garment like the chador or burqa.  
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problem – the problem is that women who veil tend to be also those that trust that 
social justice will inevitably come with an Islamist regime.  Ahmed argues that this 
is naïve: Islam does indeed allow for social justice and gender equality but 
conservative religious forces cannot be relied upon to implement the law in this 
way. In their hands Islam, like any religion, can be used to justify laws and 
practices that are deeply discriminatory, and harmful to women.  
 
Summary points 
 
•  The secularist approach to gender equality does exist within MMCs and tends 
to be brought to the fore when communicating with western countries and 
donors. However, it does not necessarily have wide appeal in MMCs; it is often 
seen as a foreign imposition; 
•  Women throughout the Islamic world want social justice for themselves and 
others; the majority fervently believe that Islam can deliver this;  
 There is a major distinction between a) those who believe that patriarchal and 
cultural interpretations of Islamic texts have led to women‟s inferior status, and 
must therefore be revisited and reinterpreted, and b) those who believe that 
these interpretations imply women are different, not inferior, so religious texts 
are not in need of reinterpretation; 
•  It is often difficult for women to unite as a political lobby for women‟s rights in 
MMCs, given these differences in perspective; 
•  The greatly increased propensity of women to veil today is a new 
phenomenon; its significance must be understood with reference to the social 
and economic background of those veiling; what they are saying about their 
identity as Muslims but also about their aspirations as modern women who 
want to work and travel in a way that makes them feel comfortable and gains 
them respect not approbation. 
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3.0  Women and Islamist political parties   
 
3.1 Islamist political parties – those that believe that Islamic law, the Shari‟ah, 
should replace secular law - have come to the fore in many MMCs.  The liberal 
secularist view is that these parties are taking the cause of women „backwards‟. 
This section analyses what the literature says about women‟s support for, and 
membership of, Islamist parties and implicitly raises questions for DFID‟s political 
systems and state building work. 
 
3.2 So far no Islamist parties have been elected to form a government unless 
one counts Turkey.14  As mentioned, we do not categorise the AKP Turkish 
governing party as „Islamist‟ as it is committed to retaining secularism as a 
constitutional principle.15 For our purposes here we refer to parties like the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine, Jamaat-e-
Islami in Bangladesh, the Party for Justice and Development in Morocco and 
Islamist parties in Pakistan, Yemen, Indonesia and Jordan that have contested 
elections.  
 
3.3 In the Western media many of these parties have been presented as 
„extremist‟, on the basis that some have used violence, and that for many western 
commentators, there is no such thing as a „moderate Islamist‟ (Hamzawy 2005:1). 
Political extremism is merged with social extremism, i.e. the belief that they will 
introduce Shari‟ah law if they come to power and this will oppress women.  This 
merging of religious identity, political project, military strategy and the oppression 
of women has been capitalised upon by some MMC governments that emphasise 
the „Islamist threat‟ in order to bolster Western support for their less than 
democratic regimes.16  Yet, as Ali Abunimah notes, the violence used by Hamas 
and Hizbollah has more in common with other nationalist movements facing 
foreign occupation – such as the IRA - than any driving „Islamist‟ ideology.  And 
like the IRA their tactics have changed as they have entered the political process 
(Abunimah 2007:2). 
 
3.4 Within development circles there is a more nuanced approach to Islamist 
parties due to an appreciation that many have come to prominence, and have 
popular support, because they have filled major gaps in service provision (health, 
education, credit, justice).  They are also seen as being stronger on anti-
corruption than many secular governments. There is also an awareness that they 
are organising for the long term, to come to power through democratic means.  
This is a plus (democracy is good) but also a concern (suppose they do get 
elected?).  And again the question: what would this do for women‟s rights?  The 
short answer to this question after reviewing the literature is that it will depend on 
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 The Turkish AKP (Justice and Development Party) took 47% of the vote in the 2007 election. 
15
 The recent attack by the hard line secularist opposition (the army + judiciary) to take the party to 
court on the basis that it was unconstitutional to allow women to wear their headscarves in public 
institutions was a political ploy that failed (Barkey 2008:2).  Had the case been won it would have 
seen the banning of the party and the fall of the government – this is interesting as it shows the 
lengths secularist parties will go to get rid of an Islamic leaning government – even one that has 
been democratically elected and has a significant majority in parliament.  
16
 As Amr Hamzawy puts it: „Arab regimes have long invoked the nightmare of anti-Western fanatics 
taking power through the ballot box to frighten the United States and Europe into implicitly 
supporting these regimes‟ repressive measures towards Islamist movements‟. (2005:5) 
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the party and the political moment, as their manifestos and practices are different 
and evolving.  It is this nuance that we seek to explore in this section. 
 
Women’s involvement in Islamist parties – what do we know? 
 
3.5 For a long time parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Hizbollah 
have paid close attention to the role women can play in furthering their political 
goals and agendas (Abdellatif and Ottaway 2007:5). From their inception they set 
up women‟s branches and engaged women in electioneering, aware of women‟s 
valuable political and social capital. However, based on interviews with women 
and men in both these parties Abdellatif and Ottaway conclude that they have not 
encouraged women to participate in the mainstream business of the party and 
become leaders.  This is true for other Islamist parties like Jamaat-e-Islami 
(Jamaat from now on) in Bangladesh.  It has never once fielded a women 
candidate for a direct election in all of its 65 year history (Rice 2004:18)17. Some 
women activist supporters have got fed up with this and are pushing hard for 
greater influence. Islamist women members „… want to be seen as potential 
leaders, not just as dedicated organisational foot soldiers, and in many countries 
they are pushing the leadership of their movement for change‟  (Abdellatif and 
Ottaway ibid: 1).  
 
3.6 As women push for organisational change within Islamist parties some are 
also pushing for a clearer party position on women‟s rights.  However, the 
propensity of Islamist parties to change their position on women seems more 
gradual than their decision to formally engage in democratic politics.  As Amr 
Hamzawy notes, although Islamist parties are being gradually drawn into the 
democratic process and can see the wisdom of competing peacefully for shares 
of political power, the majority still hold „discriminatory, illiberal views on key 
sociocultural issues‟, including the status of women (Hamzawy ibid: 3.) However, 
there is evidence that change is coming, if gradually, even amongst the most 
patriarchal of organisations.  We consider below how positions have evolved in 
one Islamist party (Jamaat in Bangladesh) and one Islamist movement (the 
Muslim Brotherhood) below.  To skip these two case studies go to 3.15.  
 
Evolving positions on women’s rights  
 
(i) Jamaat-e-Islami (Bangladesh) 
 
3.7 The year 1996 was a turning point for Jamaat according to Elora 
Shehabuddin Rice. It had gained only three parliamentary seats in the election 
despite its long history as an organisation.18 According to Rice, Jamaat began to 
realise its position on women‟s rights may have had something to do with its 
electoral failure – particularly given that it operated in a world populated by NGOs 
espousing women‟s empowerment in a secular sense. But in 1996 it still had no 
policy position on women and told Rice in an interview that the „problems of 
women‟ would be solved simply by the establishment of an Islamic state (Rice 
ibid: 7). The official Jamaat position at that time was that women should observe 
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 Even the AKP in Turkey – not an „Islamist‟ party in the sense discussed here - has only one 
woman Cabinet minister and she has the token job of „Women‟s Affairs‟.  (Barkey 2007:2) 
18
 Jamaat was founded in pre-independence India in 1941. It come out of the 1972 war of 
independence with a notorious reputation – its leaders had opposed independence, and had 
allegedly collaborated with the West Pakistan army; it was seen as responsible for mass murders 
and rapes (Rice 2004:5). By 1996 it had had 25 years to recover but it still only got 3 seats. The 
question it inevitably asked was „Why?‟ 
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strict purdah and undertake outside activities only if her domestic obligations were 
fulfilled; a woman‟s most important role was transmitting Islamic values to her 
children.  But this was the late 1990s when millions of Bangladeshi women were 
working in garment factories alongside men. The Islamist position sounded out of 
date, and implicitly made women out to be „bad Muslims‟ for working and mixing 
with men. This made it easy for secularist NGOs and the Awami League (as the 
most avowedly secular of the two main parties) to present themselves as the only 
true champions of women‟s rights and to gain votes as a result (Rice ibid: 8).  
 
3.8 After 1996 there was a noticeable shift in the Jamaat position.  The party 
began to emphasise its commitment to increasing job opportunities for women 
and stopping violence against them.  It even adopted Grameen Bank type 
approaches to outreach, with Jamaat women members visiting slums, shanty 
towns and distant villages to reach large numbers of very poor women (Rice ibid: 
12). In the 2002 election its electoral gains improved somewhat – it won 17 seats 
as a junior partner in the BNP government.  How it will fare in the December 2008 
election is not known at the time of writing.  There is a general agreement that 
Jamaat needs to go a lot further towards bringing women into its organisation, 
including as candidates, and to ensure its policies acknowledge women‟s needs 
and experiences.  It is not there yet but it is moving. 
 
3.9 Is Bangladesh typical? What about other Islamists movements? Although 
the Bangladesh context is highly specific, not least because of its well established 
democratic and secular tradition, Islamist parties in other countries show similar 
signs of evolving their policies towards women.  
 
(ii) The Muslim Brotherhood (Egypt) 
 
3.10 Unlike Jamaat in Bangladesh, which was a minority member of the last 
coalition government, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is a mass movement that has 
been banned from contesting elections for much of its 90 year history. Because of 
the ban its members run as independents and in the 2005 elections in Egypt MB 
members took 88 seats, making it the largest opposition group. It is anticipated 
that the ban will be lifted soon and in anticipation of this the MB has prepared a 
draft party platform.  It is worth looking at this latest document to see how the 
positioning of the MB on women‟s rights has changed over time. 
 
3.11 When the Muslim Brotherhood was created in 1928 its founder wrote that 
the „problem of women‟ must be addressed in a way that combined the 
„progressive and the protective‟. By today‟s standards the protective element 
dominated with calls for „a campaign against ostentation in dress and loose 
behavior‟,  „segregation of male and female students‟, „a separate curriculum for 
girls‟ and private meetings between men and women „to be counted as a crime 
unless within the permitted degrees of relationship...‟.19  In short purdah was the 
answer to the problem of women. 
 
3.12 As one might expect, the Muslim Brotherhood has changed with the times 
– although it is difficult to be sure about how far. Acknowledging that women now 
work outside the home its policy paper on women „The Role of Muslim Women in 
an Islamic Society‟20 uses ijtihad (Islamic textual interpretation) to make the case 
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 „Toward the Light‟ in Five Tracts of Hasan al-Banna, translated by Charles Wendell, Berkeley 
1978:126ff. 
20
 To download the MB policy: www.jannah.org/sisters/ikhwom.html 
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for women‟s rights to work, vote, be elected, and occupy public and governmental 
posts.  However, as with Jamaat in Bangladesh, this is no more than an 
acknowledgement of reality.  The really important issues for women - their rights 
around marriage, divorce, child custody, inheritance and the right of women to 
confer citizenship to their children – are not mentioned, either in this paper or in 
the draft party platform.  Whilst the MB accepts women‟s rights „within an Islamic 
framework‟ it gives no indication of what this means.   
 
3.13 Nor does it explicitly define its stance on Shari‟ah, the interpretation of 
which will also affect women‟s rights if the MB comes to power. As Hamzawy 
argues, references to Shari‟ah in the draft party platform need to be much more 
precise because of the nature of the Shari‟ah, which „…is not a code, a simple 
written document that everyone can consult. It is a body of rules and 
interpretations developed over a period of thirteen centuries by different schools 
of jurisprudence…the Brotherhood could put to rest many fears by being clearer 
about the principles it considers central.…‟   (Hamzawy, Ottaway and Brown 
2007:6). 
 
3.14 Perhaps the issue for the Muslim Brotherhood, unlike Jamaat, is that its 
success at the polls in 2005 makes it feel it does not see the need to court the 
women‟s vote as it clearly has a proportion of this already.  On the other hand 
there may be internal divisions that make a clear policy on women‟s rights difficult 
to agree.  In the meantime, women themselves are angling for greater 
representation within party structures rather than being confined to the „women‟s 
arm‟ of the movement where they have no power to argue policy positions.    
 
Is change just window dressing? 
 
3.15 So do these two case studies indicate that the evolution of Islamist 
positions on women is just a ploy to bring in the women‟s vote?  And when there 
are enough of these then the party does not need to evolve its position further?  
What would happen if either of the above parties came to power?  Would they 
„revert‟ to their most conservative and oppressive positions vis a vis women?   
 
3.16 This is difficult to answer and the literature gives few clues. Undoubtedly 
all Islamist parties contain some highly conservative forces but also those that 
want to present the party as a modern party, sympathetic to women‟s concerns 
and open to interpreting the religious texts in a way that gives women what they 
want: a party that allows them to show their religious faith but also provides them 
with social justice. The question is whether Islamist parties are able to get this 
balance right.  If they are then there is a very good chance of them capturing and 
maintaining women‟s support – not so much that of the elite who may remain 
suspicious of their ultimate intentions, but of ordinary women who want to do right 
by Islam but also have their rights as women respected by their families and by 
the state.   
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Summary points 
 
•  Islamist parties are evolving their democratic credentials and their positions on 
women – though the latter more slowly; 
•  Islamist parties have moved from a „purdah‟ position to one that supports 
women as economic and political actors. But they are dragging their feet on 
women‟s personal and family rights – the power base of the religious 
establishment; 
•  There are significant differences of view on women‟s rights within Islamist 
parties but they are difficult for outsiders to see; 
•  Parties are out for votes; women are a critical constituency; evolving policies in 
line with what the majority of ordinary women feel comfortable with (Muslim 
identity + social justice) makes electoral sense;  
•  This may mean that parties will have reduced chances of winning 
parliamentary seats if there is a fear that conservative elements hold sway, 
and the party will „regress‟ towards hard-line interpretations of Islam if it comes 
to power; 
•   It follows: having entered the democratic process Islamist parties have an 
incentive to come over as politically and socially „moderate‟, not as hard liners; 
•  For donors: understanding the internal dynamics of Islamist parties is 
important as they may form future governments. Understanding their stand on 
gender issues is also critical.  Donors can give non-interfering support (e.g. 
supporting opportunities for Islamist and non-Islamist women to build alliances; 
funding projects that interpret religious texts in ways that uphold women‟s 
rights; supporting women‟s struggles to become elected political 
representatives).21  
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 See „Breaking the Stereotype: Yemeni female candidates in elections‟. This publication, in Arabic 
and English, is funded by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. With the ultimate aim of increasing the number of 
women representatives in parliament and local councils it documents the experiences of Yemeni 
women that ran in national and local elections from 1993-2006. 
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4.0  Women, Islam and civil society 
 
4.1 International development assistance has played a huge role in building 
the capacity of civil society in the countries it supports.  Assistance has mainly 
been to secular or Christian organisations on the basis that these espouse 
familiar and shared values. Civil society has also been defined in ways that make 
sense to the poverty mission; thus, the emphasis has been on funding organised 
groups that can help fill government gaps – in health, education and credit 
services – and that can reach populations, normally the poorest or least 
accessible, that government can‟t or won‟t.  Increasingly NGOs have also been 
used in the good governance agenda – to help inform ordinary people about their 
rights and to encourage them to make demands on the state system, thereby 
building a citizen-state relationship.22  
 
4.2 What has often been missing – because it has no immediately obvious 
relevance to the aid delivery project – is a focus on indigenous social movements 
that don‟t want or don‟t need western donor funding. And in Muslim majority 
countries such movements include those that are Islamic in their form and 
purpose. Such movements pass the aid effort like ships in the night.  Yet 
indigenous social movements are important to understand:  they can be important 
local drivers and reflectors of social change; they can also morph into political 
movements with national, regional or global significance. 
 
4.3 This section looks at just one example of a social movement.  This is the 
women‟s study circle or piety movement: groups of women meeting regularly in 
one another‟s houses or in the local mosque to read the Qur‟an and hadith and 
be instructed in the significance of the Islamic texts by women (sometimes men) 
religious teachers.  Religious classes for women in MMCs are not a new 
phenomenon, but their proliferation in the last decade has been dramatic.23  In 
some ways, attendance at religious classes is a parallel phenomenon to 
increased veiling.  Like veiling, study circles need to be understood from within 
their current social context rather than with reference to what they signified a 
generation ago. Thus we explore them as „new‟ phenomena even though they 
continue a past tradition. 
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 In MMC countries that have been not major recipients of western donor funds (most Arab 
countries) women‟s movements have not been NGO-ised – or at least not until recently.  In tracing 
the history of Arab women‟s movements Islah Jad notes that they emerged in the first half of the 
twentieth century when  Arab women formed organisations to enhance women‟s participation in 
battles for independence and also to „advance‟ women in the realms of education, political 
participation and cultural life (Jad 2004:2)  These movements involved large numbers of women that 
had a cause to defend or a mission to implement and were based on the mobilising energy of core 
cadres (such as the women‟s committees that sustained the first Palestinian Intifada).  Only more 
recently has NGOisation (as Jad calls it) come to the fore – partly a result of increased US funding 
for civil society organisations in Arab countries, including women‟s NGOs, in an effort to 
„democratise‟ and contain authoritarian states.  These new NGOs are quite differently structured to 
the mass movements of the past and although their function is seen positively in some quarters in 
others there is a fear that they constitute a „new and growing form of dependency on the West‟ (Jad 
ibid: 1). 
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 Even by 1995 study circles were being held in all Cairo neighbourhoods according to Mahmood.  
This coverage is extraordinary considering that Cairo is a city of some 16m people (2006 figures).  
We could not get equivalent data for other urban centres in MMCs, but presume this varies. 
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4.4 Saba Mahmood‟s account of religious study classes in Cairo is our 
primary reference material for this section.  We have chosen her work because of 
its comprehensive ethnographic analysis but also because of her approach.24  It is 
not Mahmood‟s intention either to find a „redeemable element‟ in what, for many, 
constitute an illiberal and socially conservative movement, i.e. to look for aspects 
that would make them more palatable to liberal sensibilities (Mahmood 2005:5). 
Rather she focuses on what they say about conceptions of the self, moral agency 
and politics and asks her readers to do the same, thereby discouraging the 
tendency to assess the movements from a given normative position - liberalist, 
secularist, feminist etc. 
 
Study circles – a piety movement 
 
4.5 The content of study circle classes follow a fairly similar pattern regardless 
of country. The teacher provides a commentary in either colloquial Arabic, or the 
language of participants, on selected passages from the Qur‟an and hadith. The 
aim is to instruct women attendees about how they can live their everyday lives in 
accordance with Islam. All the women Mahmood talked to, teachers and 
attendees, felt that piety had gone out of religious practice, which had become 
formulaic; they wanted to bring the spirit of Islam into their lives and have it 
regulate their daily routine and their thoughts. In the words of one teacher „…the 
difficult question that confronts us today as Muslims is how to make our daily lives 
congruent with our religion while at the same time moving with the world…. For 
me, proselytization means doing it from within ordinary acts and practicalities and 
translating worship into everyday practices so that these are always directed 
toward God‟ (Mahmood ibid: 46). 
4.6 How each study class runs and its atmosphere depends on the teacher 
and the background of participants.  Mahmood notes that in a middle class 
neighbourhood of Cairo the teacher, when asked a specific question about how 
women should conduct themselves in a particular social situation, would spell out 
several jurists‟ opinions on the subject without providing a specific 
recommendation.  She therefore trained her audience in „interpretive practice‟, i.e. 
the need for participants to make individual choices about the right path to follow 
(Mahmood ibid: 85).  She compares this with the classes held in working class 
neighbourhoods where teachers would employ a more rhetorical style, with 
graphic descriptions of God‟s wrath and the tortures of hell that would rain down 
on those that went astray.  Lessons in these neighbourhoods tended to be noisy 
and participative with frank questions put to the teacher about incest, sexual 
problems and neighbourhood skirmishes. „The atmosphere is charged with 
intense energy and excitement, with women often shouting their questions to the 
da‟iyat (teacher) arguing with positions they regard as erroneous, and protesting 
when the lessons finished sooner than scheduled‟ (Mahmood ibid: 92). 
4.7 The organisation of study classes and whom they involve differs by 
country. In some counties the target group is largely middle class: for example, in 
Sana‟a in Yemen, classes (called nadwas) tend to bring together middle class 
women rather than the poorest although the latter are not excluded (Clarke 2004). 
The same is true for Pakistan where the study circle phenomenon had a rather 
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this particular study is a reflection of the movement in Egypt in the 1990s. However, our own 
experience (in Pakistan and London) indicate that her analysis has generic significance, even if the 
external form of what she describes differs by country (e.g. in Egypt classes are mosque not home 
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unusual genesis. As Sadaf Ahmad explains, the past decade has seen large 
numbers of Pakistani women turning towards Islam via Al-Huda, an Islamic 
school for women created in Islamabad in 1994 (Ahmad, 2008: 63-80). The 
school began by running a full-time one-year diploma courses for women on a 
range of Islamic subjects.  It was extraordinarily successful.  A range of courses 
now meet the needs of many different women: housewives with children, young 
girls, college students, working women and so on.  When they graduate alumni 
set up study circles in their homes and neighbourhoods thereby massively 
extending the reach of Al-Huda. Meanwhile the energetic founder of the 
movement makes adept use of the television, internet and the print media to get 
her message of piety „out there‟.  
 
4.8 Study circle classes, and the more general phenomenon of women‟s 
interest in getting beyond ritual practices (dress, praying, fasting etc.) and wanting 
to live out Islamic principles in their everyday lives, raise interesting questions.  
Are these movements of social change? In identifying what they are it is useful to 
start with what they are not. 
 
4.9 Study circle classes are not a forum for contesting patriarchal 
interpretations of Islam.  The teachers are not Muslim feminist scholars but 
women who have had some formal theological training (often not a lot) or who 
have taken it upon themselves to become well versed in the Qur‟an and hadith 
and have been given the authority to hold classes by the local mosque committee 
(in some countries a government licence is required). The classes are not about 
conceptual issues like gender equality but focus on practice – what you should 
and shouldn‟t do in particular situations. In this sense they are part of the wider 
Islamic „revivalist‟ movement that includes a thriving industry in tape-recorded 
sermons, religious debates on TV and religious lessons on radio.  All of these 
media efforts, like the study circle classes, seek to engage ordinary people with 
classical commentaries on the religious texts to guide their everyday behaviour 
(Mahmood ibid: 80). 
 
4.10 Nor are study circles about confronting the established political order in 
any sense; they are not trying to bring about changes in political institutions. 
Currently classes do not function as organising or recruiting venues for Islamist 
political parties, although they may provide gradualist entry points in some 
countries (this is discussed in the annotated bibliography). Indeed, Mahmood 
notes that in Egypt Islamist parties have criticised the study circle movement for 
its lack of socio-political content (Mahmood ibid: 52). And finally, study circle 
classes should not be seen as related to religious schools or madrassas.  The 
latter are part of the education system (government or private) and have a formal 
curriculum.  This is not the case with study classes that are run for adult women, 
often in their homes, and focus not on learning to recite the Qur‟an in its entirety 
but on interpreting its spirit to guide everyday behaviour. 
 
4.11 Even if the movement appears to have no political objectives it is seen to 
have political potential. Its „transformative power‟ is recognised in several MMCs.  
Hence there have been efforts to bring it under state control.  In Egypt this takes 
the form of a legal requirement for all study centre teachers to undergo a two-year 
training programme run by the Ministry of Religious Affairs in order to qualify for a 
state licence.  Those found teaching without a licence are liable to a fine and 
imprisonment. Government surveillance of mosque lessons has increased so that 
now government officials can be seen sitting at the back recording the teaching 
and discussion (Mahmood ibid: 75). All the mosques where Mahmood conducted 
her research have had their lessons closed down for certain periods.  The 
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government response to protests against these regulations is that this is a means 
of weeding out „extremist elements‟ and preventing them from propagating their 
ideas. It is worth noting that Mahmood reports no instance of finding extremist 
thought or instruction in any of the study classes she visited throughout her 
lengthy study.  
 
What does the piety movement signify? 
 
4.12 The question raised by women‟s study circles for donors is basically „What 
do they signify?‟  This translates into three questions, each of which reflects an 
effort to explain the phenomenon in familiar terms.  
• Do study circle classes signify an invidious form of religious indoctrination, a 
way of instructing women in conservative interpretations of Islam, in order to 
maintain their „obedience‟ to patriarchy and the power of leaders, be they 
political or religious? 
• Are they a nascent political identity movement, capable of becoming a 
political force given sufficient organisation? Might they be future antagonists 
against a corrupt, undemocratic or impious state?  Or could they be organised 
into an overt anti-western mass movement? 
• Do they afford empowerment at a local level? Do they give women 
confidence, particularly less educated women, and allow them to become 
more authoritative actors vis a vis their husbands and fathers?  I.e. do they 
increase women‟s agency in their homes and communities? 
 
4.13 As noted earlier, there is no evidence to suggest that study classes 
constitute a plot by religious establishments.  In fact, the mere proliferation of 
study circles, the fact that they often take place in private spaces (homes), and 
are led by women for women make them difficult to regulate or control – either by 
the religious establishment or the state.  Nor is there evidence of study circles 
„turning political‟ although the potential is there.  So far however it seems that 
women who attend classes do not automatically vote for Islamist parties for the 
reasons given in the previous section.   
 
4.14 Do study circles allow for a form of empowerment? Mahmood was 
concerned not to use explanatory frameworks derived from normative positions 
(secularist, western, developmental, feminist) so she purposively avoids trying to 
explain the movement in these terms.  Nor does she report instances of women 
saying they felt their knowledge „helped them‟ in discussions with their families.  
However, study circle participants frequently asked teachers to give them 
religious guidance about everyday family, sexual and neighbourhood problems.  
The fact that they are gaining knowledge about addressing these issues from the 
highest source (Islamic texts) and that they are receiving instruction in a form of 
reasoning that will make sense to, and be respected by, male family members 
cannot help but increase their sense of confidence and their ability to be heard.  
Our own sense is that these classes are very important empowerment 
mechanisms for women, at least in terms of their intra-familial and neighbourhood 
relations. 
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Summary points 
 
•  The donor focus on NGOs as the main constituents of civil society overlooks 
movements that reflect, and are themselves influencing, social change;  
•  Millions of women in MMCs now attend religious study circles. This is a new 
experience for most women - in previous generations women had very little 
access to religious training;  
•  Study circles need to be seen first and foremost as a piety movement; their 
adherents‟ main purpose is to get beyond formulaic manifestations of Islam 
and let religion guide their everyday actions and thoughts;  
• As far as we can ascertain they do not encourage women to critique 
patriarchal readings of the texts; 
•  There is little evidence to suggest study circles are politicised – although they 
may provide a link to Islamist parties in the longer term; 
•   However, our hypothesis is that these study circles can be enormously 
empowering for women in a personal and familial sense rather than a political 
sense. They give women an alternative means of gaining respect and authority 
within their households and immediate communities - an empowerment route 
most have not had before. 
 
 
Concluding remarks on this paper 
 
The social, political and economic contexts within which women live in MMCs are 
in a constant process of change. Their increased literacy, access to information 
and communication technologies, as well as to wage-earning work, and their 
appropriation of religious knowledge from previously closed, male-dominated 
circles means that Muslim women are constructing their own modernity.  This 
symbolises a break from many traditional practices as well as from Western 
conceptions of progress and equality. 
 
As noted in the introduction, the aim of this paper has been to stimulate interest 
around the changing contexts of women in MMCs that we think many SDAs will 
know about and are interested in, but may not be fully aware of.  We also hope 
the paper and accompanying bibliography will stimulate policy and practical 
discussions amongst a wider group, at a country level and in the UK, including 
with other HMG departments, about women‟s struggles for gender rights in 
Muslim majority countries.  
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Annex 1.  The evidence base for increasing religiosity 
 
This paper and the accompanying annotated bibliography present the rise in Islamic 
religiosity – the self-expression of personal faith - as a given phenomenon. So too do 
those whose work we reference.  Merhan Kamrava, editing a reader on „new voices‟ of 
Islam expresses the views of MMC writers on Islam when he says: 
 
„Beginning in the 1970s and lasting up to the present day, levels of religiosity have 
risen in depth and intensity among the Muslim masses all over the world. Observers of 
Islamic societies today cannot help but be impressed by the depth and the degree to 
which Islam has re-emerged as an integral part of the average person‟s identity. This 
is especially the case amongst the very urban classes who looked for definitions of the 
self in largely non-religious terms a mere two or three decades ago…. Whatever its 
cause and genesis, religiosity has seen a steady resurgence throughout the cultures 
and societies of Muslim lands‟. (Kamrava 2006:5) 
 
For those living or working in MMCs, or making regular visits over the last 20 years, signs 
of increased religiosity are readily evident. The most visible is women‟s increased use of 
the veil and in particular types of veil that indicate religious faith not cultural tradition. 
Other changes in religious practice affecting one or both sexes include increased mosque 
attendance, a greater proportion of people praying five times a day, a larger number 
fasting in Ramadan and increased attendance by women at religious study circle 
meetings. However, getting quantitative, country based data on these and other religious 
trends is difficult. 
 
There are two problems with measuring religiosity.  The first is that religious practice is not 
always a reliable indicator of personal volition or heart-felt belief. Thus, for example, the 
fact that 100% of women veil in Iran and in Taliban controlled areas of Afghanistan and 
Pakistan reflects the mandatory nature of veiling in these contexts. Similarly the radical 
changes in women‟s dress in a country like Somalia must be seen as a response to the 
conflict – by wearing trousers (not a Somali tradition) during the civil war women sought to 
protect themselves from violence and particularly rape. The protective forms of dress 
gradually became symbols of respectability, and, supported by the religious 
establishment, religiosity.
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  And to take a quite different example: the number of parents 
opting to send their children to religious schools may be due to their own religiosity but it 
may also be to do with their poverty (madrassahs provide board and lodging) or the poor 
quality of education they receive in their local state school. 
 
The second difficulty is the data itself.  There are hundreds of small-scale studies on 
aspects of religiosity, many carried out by universities in MMCs.  Many of these are at one 
point in time – although some indicate trends. We can find no volume that brings even a 
fraction of these together and links their analyses.  This makes it difficult to provide 
quantitative evidence for our basic statement that religiosity is increasing in the Islamic 
world – even though the evidence is reflected in many individual studies.   
 
What we can do is list the indicators that different studies are using to measure aspects of 
religiosity.  Some of the indicators are specific to women‟s religiosity but most relate to the 
phenomenon more generally. 
                                                        
25
 See Cawo Mohamed Abdi for a detailed analysis of how the civil war and continuing violence 
transformed women‟s dress codes in Somalia - which then became institutionalised as a symbol of 
religiosity. Abdi 2007:18183-207  
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Indicators used in MMCs to assess increasing religiosity (and our comments) 
 
•  The increase in veiling by women (lots of small studies, all showing a rise in numbers 
adopting Islamic dress. The increasing number of Islamic dress shop outlets in any 
one country, and their sales turnovers, is a proxy indicator); 
•  The increase in the number of mosques in the last 1-2 decades (there have been huge 
increases in most MMCs; also rates of mosque attendance, e.g. at the Friday prayer) 
•  The number of religious study circles for women (discussed in this paper); 
•  The number of madrassahs and the actual number of children attending (International 
Crisis Group reports give data for some countries); 
•  The number of higher learning institutions specialising in religious teaching; the 
number of students registered in famous mosque-universities and their affiliates (all 
report significant increases: Kamrava notes there are now over 1m students affiliated 
to al-Azhar University – ibid:5); 
•  The number who define themselves as Muslim first and their nationality second (more 
commonly surveyed in countries where Muslims are minorities – but also in some 
MMCs, e.g. over 70% of Muslims in Malaysia self-defined as Muslim first in a recent 
survey);
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•  The number that say they want Shari‟ah law (many national surveys, not co-ordinated, 
nor is it always clear what respondents understand by Shari‟ah); 
•  The number of Islamic banks/investment companies and investment trends;  
•  The number of those applying to go on the Hajj (countries have quotas so it is 
necessary to look at the number of years it is now necessary to wait until permission is 
granted. Thus, for example it is currently 3 years in Malaysia);
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•  The number of religious bookstores in a town; the publication and sale of religious 
books and videos;  
•  The amount of space in national newspapers devoted to answering questions about 
religion from readers (easy to assess on an individual paper basis); 
 •  The number of television and radio broadcasts dedicated to Islamic teaching and 
debate (viewing rates are also important); 
•  The number of internet sites and blogs on Islam (e.g. the number of personal videos 
made about Islam on YouTube; the number of hits on Islamic religious sites). 
 
Whatever the issues measured the general finding on Islamic religiosity is that the trend is 
upwards.  The interesting question is the reasons people themselves give for this, given 
that it may mean changing very fundamental aspects of their lives. Again, although there 
are many small studies that ask this question we could find none that analysed overall 
findings and tried to account for similarities and differences between and within countries, 
let alone by other factors, for example, gender or ethnicity. 
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 This study by Patricia Martinez at the University of Malaysia is one example of a host of small 
scale studies on religiosity in MMCs. It was picked up and reported by Women living under Muslim 
laws. See „Malaysia: increasing religiosity in Malaysia causes a stir‟. WMUML website. 
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 Reported in „Malaysia: increasing religiosity in Malaysia causes a stir‟. WMUML website. 
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Annex 3.  Questions which could form the basis of a reading 
pack or discussion session during an SDA reading week 
 
As part of our TOR we were asked to suggest questions that might stimulate discussions 
around the issues discussed in this paper and the annotated bibliography. There is no 
right answer to any of the questions below – they are suggested solely as examples of the 
sort of questions that might form the basis of a discussion session or a reading pack.  The 
best questions however, will be those that participants will raise themselves. 
1.   „There is no gender equality in Islam‟.  How would you respond to this statement? 
 
2.   How might someone having a secularist, Muslim feminist and Islamist approach 
respectively view the issue of polygny?  What sources of evidence might each use 
to support their position? 
 
3.   Why do you think the subject of veiling so exercises non-Muslims?   
 
4.   You are at an international conference on women and Islam. You want to make the 
point that collaboration is possible between secularists and Muslim feminists on 
women‟s rights (the debate going on at the time is polarising these positions). What 
issues would you choose to illustrate they can agree?  (And on which issues is 
finding common ground likely to be more difficult?) 
 
5.    What impact do you think the increasing influence of religious parties over officially 
secularist governments has had on the status of women in MMCs? Give examples.  
 
6.   What conditions do you think need to be in place for Islamist parties to encourage: 
a) the political participation of women; and b) to address discrimination against 
women in areas of family law, e.g. divorce, inheritance, custody of children etc.? 
 
7.   What is your understanding of study circles? Can they be called social movements?  
Are they indoctrinating, empowering or both?  What possibilities do you see for 
them morphing into political movements? 
 
